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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-DEFAULT OF AGENT-GUARANTORS AND OF PURCHASER
-EFFECT OF NEW CONTRACT ON CoMMISSIONS.-Defendant-vendor
and his selling agents agreed that the latter would receive their com-
missions when the vendor received final payments on a conditional
sales contract, payments thereon guaranteed by the agents. Five
weeks after the vendee failed to make the final payments, the vendor,
without notice to the agents, entered into new contracts with the
vendee, extending time for payment. After payments were completed
-almost two years after the original due date-plaintiff, assignee of
selling agents, sued to recover the commissions. The defendant con-
tended that the agents' failure to pay on default was such a material
breach of the agency-guaranty contract that they forfeited the com-
missions., The Court held that the substitution of new contracts and
final payment thereon terminated liability on the guaranty and en-
titled the agents to the commissions. Clark v. Ashbach & Sons, Inc.,
64 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1954).
Ordinarily, the broker or selling agent, upon production of a
customer ready, willing and able to accept the terms stipulated by the
broker's principal, is entitled to his commission, regardless of whether
or not the transaction is eventually completed.' Consequently, any
subsequent modification of those terms 2 or cancellation 3 of the con-
tract by the principal and third party will not affect the broker's rights
which have already accrued. However, the principal may desire that
his agent share the risk of default by the customer and may make the
payment of the commission dependent on some condition precedent,4
such as, on the sale being consummated, 5 or on payment being re-
ceived.6 Under such an agreement the broker's rights are not
1 Barnard v. Monnot, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 108 (N.Y. 1866) ; Nagl v. Small,
159 Iowa 387, 138 N.W. 849 (1912); Gransbury v. Saterbak, 116 Minn. 339,
133 N.W. 851 (1911).
2 Wolfgang v. Naumann, 199 Iowa 585, 202 N.W. 216 (1925) ; Sotham v.
Kern, 221 Mich. 5, 190 N.W. 744 (1922); McDermott v. Fairmont Gas &
Light Co., 88 W. Va. 692, 108 S.E. 264 (1921).3Richmond-Carcia Oil Co. v. Coates, 17 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1927) ; Vining
v. Mo-La Oil Co., 312 Mo. 30, 278 S.W. 747 (1925).
4 However, ". . . an agreement should not be so construed unless such a
result is clearly intended." Colvin v. Post Mortgage & Land Co., 225 N.Y.
510, 516, 122 N.E. 454, 455 (1919).
5 See, e.g., Dermody v. New Jersey Realties, Inc., 101 N.J.L. 334, 128 Ad.
265 (1925); Realty Investments, Inc. v. Harris, 166 Pa. Super. 211, 70 A.2d
427 (1950).6 See, e.g., Cheatham v. Yarbrough, 90 Tenn. 77, 15 S.W. 1076 (1890);
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defeated if the principal hinders or prevents performance by the cus-
tomer, for the principal is then deemed to have waived performance
of the condition. 7
While the principal may not disregard the broker's rights, he
is not prevented from attempting to protect his own interests.8 Thus,
if commissions are dependent on some condition precedent, a modifi-
cation of the terms of the contract between the principal and third
party, if justifiable, will not of itself entitle the broker to his commis-
sions. Accordingly, where the change made more probable the per-
formance of the condition by a third party previously unwilling or
unable to perform, recovery has been dependent on performance of
the contract as modified; 9 if performed, the broker may recover; 1°
non-performance of the condition, however, may be a complete bar.'1
Even the cancellation of a contract by a principal because of the third
party's default, followed by a new contract for substantially the same
performance, has been treated as a modification of the original con-
tract, continuing the broker's rights in the contract as revised.' 2
Cancellation under those circumstances would not constitute an act of
prevention,' 3 nor would it bar recovery by the broker if the prerequi-
site performance were completed according to the revised contract.' 4
In the instant case the agents' commissions were conditioned on
final payments by the third party vendee. Thus, from a purely bro-
kerage point of view, the question would be whether the agents' right
to commissions was transferred to the new contracts between the
vendor and the vendee, with commissions payable on their perfor-
mance,'0 or whether the making of the new contracts was an unjus-
Pederson v. North Yakima & East Selah Irr. Co., 63 Wash. 636, 116 Pac. 279
(1911).
7 Realty Investments, Inc. v. Harris, szpra note 5; Cheatham v. Yarbrough,
supra note 6; accord, Dermody v. New Jersey Realties, Inc., supra note 5;
Pederson v. North Yakima & East Selah Irr. Co., supra note 6; cf. Moses v.
Bierling, 31 N.Y. 462 (1865).
8 Seymour v. St. Luke's Hospital, 28 App. Div. 119, 50 N.Y. Supp. 989
(1st Dep't 1898), appeal dismissed, 159 N.Y. 524, 53 N.E. 1132 (1899) ; Dallas
Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311 (1939).
9 See Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, supra note 8
(Where a commission was payable pro rata out of purchase price installments,
part payment on the modified contract permitted a recovery on that part only.).
'
0 See Prince v. Selby Smelting & Lead Co., 35 Cal. App. 684, 170 Pac.
1075, 1076 (1917).
11 McPhail v. Buell, 87 Cal. 115, 25 Pac. 266 (1890) ; Prince v. Selby Smelt-
ing & Lead Co., supra note 10; see Bliven v. Lighthouse, 231 N.Y. 64, 131 N.E.
570 (1921).
12 See Dunne v. Colomb, 192 Cal. 740, 221 Pac. 912, 914 (1923).
13 Ibid.
1 Kane v. Neptune Shipping Ltda., 274 App. Div. 28, 79 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1st Dep't 1948); George C. Lemcke Co. v. Nordby, 117 Wash. 221, 200 Pac.
1103 (1921) ; see Dunne v. Colomb, supra note 12, 221 Pac. at 914.
15 See notes 10 and 11 supra.
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tifiable act of prevention by the principal; in the latter case, commis-
sions would be due without reference to performance of the subsequent
contracts. 16 The Court did not frame this issue clearly, but stated
that ". . . the primary contract ... has been fully executed . . ." and
the agents were entitled to commissions when the ". . . price had been
paid in full." '17 Such language would indicate that the Court was
actually treating the new contracts as modifications of the orig-
inal contract rather than new, independent contracts.
However, interjected into the brokerage question, is the fact
that the agents did not perform their guaranty obligation. Never-
theless, the Court, referring to the agent-guarantors' position during
the time between the vendee's default and the signing of the new con-
tracts, said that "[t] here was nothing they did or failed to do which
would have forfeited the commission." 18 The Court, therefore, did
not regard the failure of the agents to perform their guaranty obliga-
tion as sufficient to deprive them of commissions. Although the
creditor-vendor did not demand that agent-guarantors make payment
upon default of the vendee-debtor, non-payment at maturity may give
rise to an absolute liability on the part of the guarantors. Usually
there is no requirement that the creditor make demand of the guar-
antor of payment, or that he notify him of the default; 19 non-payment
by the guarantor is of itself a breach of the guaranty contract.
Taking the brokerage and guaranty arrangements together, the
agents' rights to the commissions, or as the Court indicated, their
interest in the new contracts, should depend on whether non-payment
of their guaranty obligation was a wilful breach of the agency-
guaranty contract. Of course, a subsequent payment of the obliga-
tion,20 or an extension of time after maturity of the debt, 21 both of
16 See note 7 supra.
17Clark v. Ashbach & Sons, Inc., 64 N.W.2d 517, 523 (Minn. 1954)
(emphasis added).
18 Id., 64 N.W.2d at 524.
'
9 Bryant Park Bldg., Inc. v. Richmond, 85 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Welch v. Walsh, 177 Mass. 555, 59 N.E. 440 (1901); Sherman, Clay & Co. v.
Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931); see Matter of Bitker, 251 Wis.
538, 30 N.W2d 449, 452 (1947); see Mortgage & Contract Co. v. Linenberg,
260 Mich. 142, 244 N.W. 428 (1932) (Five justices concurred that notice to
the guarantor of the debtor's default was not necessary to establish liability,
but that loss to the guarantor caused by lack of notice would be an affirmative
defense in a suit brought for breach of the guaranty agreement. However,
three justices indicated in a separate opinion that the guaranty contract was
breached only after the guarantor had received notice of default and a demand
for payment, and that the guarantor would not be held liable for payments
due under an acceleration clause if payments were made on all sums in default
at the time of the suit.).
20Walker v. McNeal, 134 Okla. 111, 272 Pac. 443 (1928); Tupper v.
Hartman, 121 Wash. 142, 208 Pac. 1103 (1922) (alternative holding); see
STEARNs, Suaarsni § 6.52 (5th ed., Elder, 1951).
21 Adelman v. Franklin Washington Trust Co., 137 N.J. Eq. 257, 44 A.2d
399 (Ch. 1945); Frick v. Seibel, 233 Mo. App. 200, 118 S.W.2d 497 (1938);
[ VOL. 29
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which occurred in the present case, discharges the guarantor's liability
for damages. It may be argued that these factors worked to heal
the breach of the guaranty obligation. Therefore, the new contract
following the cancellation of the original contract, if it be treated as
a modification,22 would not deprive the agent-guarantors of their com-
missions on performance of the new contracts. Yet such a rule may
lead to injustice where the principal, in face of a wilful refusal by the
agent-guarantors to pay, prejudicially changes his position.
Although in this case it appears that punctual payment on the
conditional sales contract may have been a material consideration for
the commissions, nevertheless the Court's decision may be justified
because there was nothing expressed in the agency-guaranty contract
that punctuality was essential and because there was no proof that the
agents refused or otherwise wilfully failed to pay on the guaranty
before the new contracts were made.
ARBITRATION-INCORPORATION OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE BY
REFERENCE DENiED.-Plaintiff moved for an order to stay arbitration
proceedings, contending that he had not intended to restrict his rem-
edies to arbitration by the signing of a contract which failed to men-
tion arbitration, but was, by its terms, "subject to the Cotton Yarn
Rules of 1938." These Rules provided for arbitration as an exclusive
remedy. In reversing the Appellate Division,' the Court granted
plaintiff's motion, holding that the words in the contract did not evince
a clear intent to make arbitration the exclusive remedy. Matter of
Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
Prior to the enactment of the New York Arbitration Law in
1920,2 the New York courts applied the common-law rule which de-
nied the remedy of specific enforcement to arbitration contracts. 3 It
was the judicial view at that time that disputes regarding contracts
should be settled under the auspices of the law courts, and not by
arbitration.4 However, subsequent to 1920, and due, in large measure,
see Siedentopf v. Braune, 273 App. Div. 791, 75 N.Y.S2d 326 (2d Dep't 1947).
22 See notes 12, 13 and 14 supra.
1281 App. Div. 983, 121 N.Y.S.2d 261 (2d Dep't 1953) (On the basis of
the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Level Export Corp., 305 N.Y. 82,
111 N.E.2d 218 (1953), the Appellate Division affirmed the order of the trial
court that dismissed the petition and directed that the controversy proceed to
arbitration.).2 Laws of N.Y. 1920, c. 275. This statute is presently N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
Act, Art. 84, §§ 1448-1469.3 Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491 (1858) ; see Matter of Feuer Transp.,
Inc., 295 N.Y. 87, 91, 65 N.E.2d 178, 180 (1946).
4 See Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 160, 162 (1934) ; Note, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 254, 255 n.5 (1950).
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